This time it's different [or is it?] by Thomas M. Hoenig
hose of you with several years of business 
experience in this part of the country may 
recognize that many of the things we are hear-
ing today about the economy have counter-
parts in the past: Asset values are appreciating, 
farmland values are strong and we are all 
well-aware of what has occurred this year with 
the energy markets. In short, for many in this 
area of the country, times are good.
At the start of the 1980s, we were told that 
oil prices could only go higher, farmland was 
a solid investment because “they aren’t making 
any more of it,” and housing and stock markets 
would continue to climb.
Of course, if you were involved in busi-
ness or banking 20 years ago, you will recall 
that several of the ﬁnancial decisions made on 
those speculative forecasts created their own 
sets of problems, some reaching far beyond 
local banks.
Today, I am told that while there may be 
some similarities with current banking condi-
tions and those of a quarter century ago, things 
are different this time. You may be hearing the 
same thing from investors and bankers, and, in 
fact, you may be saying to yourself: “This time, 
it’s different.”
Or is it?
Through the late ,70s and ,80s I had the 
opportunity of being an ofﬁcer in banking 
supervision at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City. I spent those years heavily involved 
in the banking crisis that enveloped the Tenth 
Federal Reserve District, a region that includes 
the central United States: Nebraska, Kansas, 
Oklahoma, Wyoming, Colorado, northern 
New Mexico and western Missouri. 
Conﬁdence abounded among borrowers, 
bankers and even supervisors during the early 
1980s. And, as with any euphoric environ-
ment, potential pitfalls abound.
I realize this is not 
new information to many 
of you—maybe to none of 
you.  But I believe that this 
is a particularly apt time to 
take a retrospective look at 
banking and ﬁnance.
We now have a new 
generation of bankers who 
haven’t experienced much 
in the way of a substan-
tial banking downturn. 
Furthermore, many who 
can recall the 1980s will 
soon be leaving the business, and we need to 
gain from their knowledge and experience be-
fore they leave.  Lastly, it never hurts to be re-
minded of important lessons.
Let me share with you some statements 
that we actually heard from bankers and bank 
directors during the ,80s:
• “I am the CEO of this bank, and we’re 
doing it my way.”
• “Yes, we loaned a hundred percent on 
this project, but everyone knows that the 
collateral value can only go up during 
construction.”
• “If you understood this better, you wouldn’t 
have a problem with it.” 
• “Although this is unconventional, our 
accountant says it is perfectly legal.” 
• “The corporate plane will save money for the 
bank in the long run.”
• “We have put our problems behind us—our 
bank rating will be much improved at our 
next exam.”
• “If it weren’t for the examiners, this bank 
wouldn’t have failed.”




1 WINTER 2007 • TENLessons from the 1980s
Before I go further, let me provide a brief 
background on the 1980s to remind us of the 
context of these stories—all of which happened 
in our Federal Reserve District. In the 1980s, 
community banks made up much of the 
District banking population, with a num-
ber of regional organizations ﬁlling out the 
total—a trend that continues today with 
additional entry by a number of large interstate 
organizations.
District banks played various roles in 
speculative booms in agriculture, energy and 
commercial real estate—all of which were sig-
niﬁcant for the District economy—and which 
all came to a precipitous end. The price of 
crude oil, for example, rose from $2.75 a bar-
rel in 1973 to a peak of nearly $37 in 1981 
before dropping to $10 in 1986. Similarly, 
farmland values in Nebraska rose by more than 
fourfold in the 10-year period before 1982, but 
then dropped by 45 percent during the next 
ﬁve years.  Inﬂation was around 13 percent at 
the beginning of the 1980s, and the prime rate 
reached 20.5 percent in 1981.
The sharp economic ﬂuctuations had a 
severe impact on District banks. During the 
1980s, 309 banks failed in District states, which 
was 11 percent of the 1980 District banking 
population. Now, let me recognize one very 
important point before I go on. Most banks 
in the 1980s, like banks today, were well-run, 
prudent and successful. But some managers 
couldn’t resist the possibility of greater proﬁt.   
These examples are designed to steer you away 
from similar mistakes.
For each of the statements I shared previ-
ously, there is a story around the events that 
eventually unfolded. I have three more state-
ments for which I want to provide the story 
of the consequences. I hope these will serve as 
examples of what you, as directors, need to be 
alert to when exercising oversight at your banks. 
Age-old behaviors, such as greed, shortsighted-
ness, and arrogance, are at the center of these 
problems, and, I would caution, they are with 
us today just as they were in the 1980s.
The ﬁrst comment stems from one of 
the most prominent examples of the ,80s
banking crisis:
“The examiners are dead wrong, they 
don’t understand what we’re doing—they 
don’t have a clue about our business.”
At the height of the agricultural, energy 
and commercial real estate booms of the late 
1970s and early 1980s, competition among 
lenders was intense. When our examiners 
would ask about a loan with questionable char-
acteristics during this period, they too often 
heard bankers say, “If I don’t make the loan, the 
banker down the street will.” In many cases, 
unfortunately, this turned out to be a race to 
the bottom.
Nowhere was this more evident than in the 
area of energy lending. Good loan underwrit-
ing standards were often swept away under an 
aura of optimism and the belief that oil prices 
could only go up. In this environment, repay-
ment ability was not a concern, especially be-
cause rising oil prices would bail out any lender, 
and good loan documentation was something 
to be done later, provided the lending business 
slowed down at some point.  
One notable or, in this case, notorious 
District energy lender was Penn Square Bank 
of Oklahoma City. If you’ve read books like 
“Funny Money” or “Belly Up,” you know a 
lot of major banks courted Penn Square and 
competed with one another to participate in 
the bank’s seemingly lucrative energy lending 
business.  Energy lending was the hottest ticket 
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real attention to Penn Square’s loan underwrit-
ing and administration, or did much in the way 
of their own due diligence. In many cases, the 
loan participations were bought on blind faith 
and unlimited optimism.
For Penn Square, this provided an incen-
tive to make loans to anyone who walked in the 
door, and Penn Square sold more than $2.1 bil-
lion in loan participations to 88 banks, includ-
ing eight of the top 50 banks in the country.   
Greed, thus, overwhelmed reason for all who 
were involved. This, in some ways, strikes me 
as similar to some “hedge funds” excesses of the 
recent past. 
The outcome of these practices back then 
was the failure of Penn Square Bank during the 
Fourth of July weekend in 1982. At the Fed-
eral Reserve, we were faced with a decision on 
whether to continue lending to Penn Square 
through the Discount Window or to stop and 
let it fail that weekend.  
With all the questionable energy loans on 
Penn Square’s books, there was little to be sal-
vaged, and a few colleagues and I found our-
selves spending the holiday weekend working 
on what to do about it.  After Penn Square’s 
failure, FDIC Chairman William Isaac made 
clear where the blame lay when he stated, “The 
Penn Square debacle was caused by a gross der-
eliction of duty on the part of the bank’s board 
of directors and management.”  
Penn Square’s failure also led to a ripple 
effect within the banking industry. A stagger-
ing total of more than $1.1 billion in Penn 
Square loans had been sold to the supposedly 
more sophisticated Continental Illinois Na-
tional Bank. These loans received little, if any, 
review by Continental Illinois’ management 
and served as the initial impetus toward that 
bank’s eventual failure in 1984. Seattle First 
National Bank was also a heavy buyer of Penn 
Square loans.  
After Penn Square’s failure, Sea-First 
quickly slipped from being a darling of stock 
market analysts to a bank shut out of funding 
markets and pushed to the brink of failure.   
The only thing that prevented it from becom-
ing the largest U.S. bank failure at that time 
was its hurried acquisition by Bank of America 
under a special Washington state failing-bank 
law. Several other major banks also took signiﬁ-
cant losses on Penn Square loans and fell into a 
weakened condition. 
The simple fact is there are times when it 
is wise not to jump on the bandwagon. In 
some instances, it is better to let the parade pass 
you by. As directors, you should be extremely 
cautious if your management can’t fully and 
clearly explain the business lines they are about 
to enter or if there is too much of a rush to 
jump in.
“If you understood this better, you 
wouldn’t have a problem with it.”
There are a host of stories from the 1980s 
and early 1990s of individuals thinking they 
had a sure thing—something that would pro-
duce spectacular returns with little or no risk.  
Unfortunately, bank directors have some-
times been caught up in this enthusiasm as 
well. One banker, for instance, became a loan 
originator, relying entirely on another organi-
zation to be the secondary market conduit.  
It seemed like a foolproof strategy with 
far better returns than the bank’s ag lending 
business in the 1980s—simply ﬁnd willing 
loan customers funneled through from dis-
tant sources, make sure the loan paperwork is 
ﬁlled out properly, and then watch the conduit 
purchase the loans and place them in the 
secondary market.  
For several years, this strategy 
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virtually no credit risk with the quick sale of 
loans, and a big boost to local employment.   
Eventually, however, the market conduit 
canceled its contract with the bank, thus leav-
ing the bank itself to fund and hold all the 
loans it was making. The bank’s balance sheet 
ballooned with the inﬂux of loans, and the 
bank soon found that many of these loans were 
of questionable quality—a fact that eventually 
led to the bank’s failure.
Another bank from this period had a his-
tory of struggling along and was glad to ﬁ-
nally pick up some new ownership, especially 
because this change brought in two fast-track 
partners from a securities ﬁrm.  Soon the bank’s 
investment portfolio was earning returns well 
above market rates—an outcome that pleased 
the directors and led to management bonuses.  
No one seemed prepared to question how 
the bank could continue to earn above-market 
returns on U.S. government securities. The an-
swer came out later.  One of the partners in the 
securities ﬁrm was charged with fraud, through 
a Ponzi scheme, and with money laundering, 
and the bank became a defendant in a securi-
ties lawsuit.  After losing the lawsuit, the bank 
was insolvent.
Similar stories can be found in other 
banks.  A particularly common story concerns 
structured notes. How many banks bought 
such notes through bond salesmen with the 
idea that they carried high returns but were 
safe because they were backed by the Federal 
Home Loan Bank System and the federal gov-
ernment? One banker even told us he didn’t 
have to worry about his securities because his 
broker “controlled” the risk for him.  In many 
cases, bankers never gave a second thought to 
the signiﬁcant risks structured notes presented 
to their banks.
“Didn’t you learn from corporate ﬁnance 
that leverage can be powerful?”
Franklin Savings was a Kansas thrift in-
stitution that made a name for itself through 
its complex arbitrage operations, expert staff 
and ability to “outsmart” major securities ﬁrms 
on trades. Franklin Savings started out as a 
small traditional thrift institution in a small 
Kansas town.  
Like many thrifts in the early 1980s, 
Franklin Savings faced substantial losses from 
interest rate mismatches in its mortgage portfo-
lio.  In response, Franklin changed its business 
model to an arbitrage and hedging strategy, us-
ing brokered deposits to fund its positions in 
mortgage-backed securities, junk bonds and 
the futures market.  
The thrift brought in an impressive staff 
of Wall Street and capital markets hotshots to 
carry out its strategies, and in just a few years, 
Franklin grew from virtually nothing to one 
of the largest and most proﬁtable thrifts in the 
country with more than $11 billion in assets. 
While Franklin Savings had impressive re-
turns for a number of years, its rapid growth 
—along with tighter thrift capital standards 
under FIRREA (Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989)—
turned its leverage into a regulatory issue.  Also, 
unexpected movements in interest rates led 
to sizable losses at Franklin in 1989, and to 
further declines in its capital ratio and net 
interest margins.  
In a dispute over accounting practices, the 
Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision seized Franklin in 
1990. What followed was a series of articles 
and court cases in which a number of well-
known arbitrage experts took turns defending 
and criticizing Franklin’s reporting of hedging 
gains and losses and the length of time it could 
take in recognizing some notable losses.  There 
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viable institution or was truly insolvent.  In the 
end, the courts largely deferred to the OTS.
Among the lessons we can learn from 
Franklin Savings is that an institution’s man-
agement should be able to explain fully its 
strategy and risk exposure to directors, current 
and prospective investors, and bank supervi-
sors. Franklin also could be regarded as fore-
runner to today’s hedge funds, except that it 
was relying on insured depositors and its thrift 
charter for funding advantages and didn’t have 
large, sophisticated investors as its target clien-
tele.  As a result, it had a great responsibility to 
be transparent in its strategies and to maintain 
its capital at prudent levels and in compliance 
with minimum supervisory standards.  
Some might quibble about whether the 
thrift examiners were knowledgeable enough to 
judge Franklin’s activities.  But they had enough 
experience by then to be skeptical when man-
agers at problem institutions would tell them: 
“We’re too sophisticated to get into trouble,” 
“You don’t understand, we know what we are 
doing,” and “We have a tax—or an accounting 
—angle that will make this pay off.”  
Conclusion
My purpose in reviewing these stories 
with you today is not that I think a return to a 
1980s-style crisis is imminent. Certainly, bank-
ing conditions today are good: strong earnings, 
good asset quality, no bank failures in more 
than two years. However, those who, in the 
early 1980s, predicted an endless rise in energy 
markets and real estate values were as conﬁdent 
in their outlook as we are today. And, certainly, 
the same rules and lessons continue to apply in 
banking and ﬁnance.
Although the world has changed during 
the last quarter of a century, at least one thing 
has not: human nature.  As I mentioned ear-
lier, greed, pride, arrogance and other human 
frailties are often at the root of bad banking 
decisions, and those qualities remain with us 
today. They still motivate behavior as they have 
in the past, and, in many cases, these frailties 
keep us from acting on the lessons we should 
have learned from previous generations.  
In addition, no matter how sophisticated 
we think current analytical tools, management 
information systems and ﬁnancial instruments 
are, the most critical element in banking is still 
individual experience and judgment. In the 
end, bank employees, and, I would stress to 
this audience, bank directors, are still making 
the important decisions. The quality of those 
decisions will always depend on human charac-
teristics and our ability to learn from the past.
One banking scholar said, “There is really 
nothing new in banking and ﬁnance, each gen-
eration just thinks there is.” 
So, are we in a different situation than 20 
years ago? I would suggest that one way we can 
ensure a different outcome is if you, in your 
oversight capacity as bank directors, are willing 
to be skeptical, willing to ask the difﬁcult ques-
tions and unwilling to accept the answer “This 
time, it’s different.”
THOMAS M. HOENIG, PRESIDENT
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
TOM HOENIG delivered this speech October 29 
at the Western States Bank Directors Education 
Foundation’s annual symposium. To learn more 
about bank director training programs from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, turn to page 30
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